Abstract:It is frequently held that cooperative marketing is one way in which farmers can gain market power. It is not often clear, however, whether the associated market results are thought to be beneficial to farmers alone or to society as a whole and whether the good effects are to come from displacing monopsonistic power in procurement, from acquiring monopoly power in final product sales, or from both. This paper explores some of these issues and briefly considers their implications for antitrust policy toward cooperatives. Two central questions are: What is the extent of restricted as opposed to open membership cooperation in the United States? If an observable pattern in membership policies exists among cooperatives, what might explain it? These questions require observation and analysis of numerous market factors, an important one being the extent to which marketing cooperatives have gained market power in their final product markets. The full significance of the empirical findings and their policy implications requires an understanding of certain basic theoretical considerations.

　　Subjects:cooperative marketing of farm produce; antitrust law; industrial procurement; United States.

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