【摘要】 20世纪70年代末,家庭联产承包责任制度的建立确立了家庭作为相对独立的农业生产经营主体。一方面确立了农户的微观经济主体地位,从客观上,为农户提供了有效的激励,成为促进农业增长和农业技术进步的重要影响因素；另一方面分散化、自负赢亏的农业生产经营机制也将农户置于市场竞争之中,独立面对市场风险。农户在市场中先天就具有弱质性,承受风险的能力差,不利于提高中国的农业劳动生产率,应对市场竞争的能力弱,更难以应对中国加入WTO后面临的激烈国际竞争,不能适应中国农业产业化和市场化的发展。小生产和大市场的矛盾越来越突出。20世纪80年代中期,中国农村出现了建立家庭承包经营基础上的农民专业合作经济组织,一改农业的家庭经营方式,将从事同类农业生产的农户组织起来进行规模经营,为广大农户提供农资供应、产品加工、产品销售、市场信息、技术交流等各类服务。还有一些专业合作经济组织联合农户统一生产、自创品牌,共同面对市场,更有效地帮助农户的分散、小规模生产适应大市场的问题,在农业结构调整、农民增收、农业增效方面发挥了很好的作用。在近几年的发展中,农民专业合作经济组织在组织原则、分配制度等方面都呈现出新的特点,统计数据中关于总量的一项的变化已经趋缓。这些都说明合作经济组织已经从数量的突飞猛进转而进入规模发展、提高效率的整合阶段。理论研究需要跟上实践的发展,虽然国内针对农民专业合作经济组织的理论研究正在逐渐丰富,但由于农民专业合作经济组织发展的时间相对较短,国内的理论研究比较多地集中于对合作的基本原则的研究和解释,合作经济组织与专业化分工的关系及其在农业产业化中的作用和地位、与政府的关系、相关法律的问题。在农民专业合作经济组织整合过程中还有很多问题亟待解决：概念界定方面需要进一步规范,对合作经济组织各项制度设计的研究,对各种类型的合作经济组织变迁的动因分析等。新制度经济学的发展为研究合作经济组织提供了很好的工具。但是目前,国内运用新制度经济理论,结合中国的现实条件,针对农民专业合作经济组织制度进行研究的著作还有待进一步丰富。本文选择运用新制度经济学的理论和方法考察中国农民专业合作经济组织的制度安排及其变迁。尝试使用交易费用理论、产权理论、集体行动的逻辑和经典的博弈模型来进行分析：为什么中国的农户会自发地建立专业合作经济组织?在怎样的外部条件下,农民专业合作经济组织才会发展?在农民专业合作经济组织发展的过程中,在不同的时期内有不同的合作组织形式占据主流。为什么会呈现这样的特点?各种类型的合作经济组织的本质区别与界限是什么?组织规模的边界是怎样的?合作经济组织在发展呈现出的趋势是什么?政府在发展中的影响如何?此外,本文还着重关注农民专业合作经济组织的产权问题。很多研究都指出模糊的产权是合作经济组织的制度缺陷。存在如此制度缺陷的组织为什么还能够发展起来?在什么条件下需要清晰界定产权?在实践中通过怎样的制度设计来弥补产权制度的缺陷?模糊产权的合作经济组织未来还有继续发展的空间吗?本文共分7章。第1章导论。在介绍本文的研究背景、选题依据和对合作的原则发展变化进行梳理的基础上,对中国农村目前存在的各种合作经济组织的概念进行了必要的解释并界定了本文研究的“农民专业合作经济组织”的含义和在实践中的具体表现形式。第2章理论回顾和文献综述。回顾介绍国内外合作经济组织的理论研究成果以及当前研究的现状：对国外的研究成果,本文结合经济理论发展的历程将合作理论进行了归类,特别是对新古典主义影响下的合作社理论和新制度经济学影响下的合作社理论,对其中有代表性的研究成果进行了较为详细的介绍；对国内的研究,根据内容进行了分类介绍。在此基础上,对国内外合作经济理论研究取得的进展和存在的不足进行了简要的评述。第3章中国农民专业合作经济组织的产生与现状。在新制度经济学的框架下,本文结合交易费用理论,分析了农业生产的监督、农产品交易中对产品的考核和契约后机会主义行为带来的交易费用问题,认为合作经济组织之所以在农业中得到发展,节约交易费用是主要原因。中国农产品市场中的交易费用问题非常突出,因为中国农业生产的鲜明特色—按人口平均承包经营土地决定了中国的农业生产规模几乎是世界上最小的,庞大的农民队伍决定了中国农产品市场中的主体几乎是世界上最多的,而且家庭承包经营制度下土地条块分割、插花式分布使中国农户生产有很强的分散性。正是基于这些原因,中国的农民专业合作经济组织在农户自发组建的基础上,获得迅速发展,文中分别介绍了合作组织的行业分布、规模等概况,并特别介绍了辽宁省农民专业合作经济组织发展现状。从介绍变迁历程和现状分析中可以看出,中国农民专业合作经济组织在萌芽阶段以专业协会为主,之后专业合作社和股份制合作社逐渐发展起来。第4章中国农民专业合作经济组织的产权制度分析。产权是制度的核心,也是人们做决策的基础。界定产权需要付出成本,也可以获得收益。国外理论研究普遍认为合作社模糊的产权制度使之成为一个低效率的组织。根据产权制度,本章中创新性地将合作经济组织分为私有产权型和公有产权型两大类,并对这两类组织的特点和制度结构进行了比较分析。通过对不同类型的合作经济组织的产权分析,提出不同产权制度下的合作经济组织对成员的控制力是不同的。要保持对成员的控制力也是合作经济组织保持产权制度需要付出的成本,即产权成本。中国的农民合作经济组织在合作的基本原则基础上,有自己独特的产权制度设计。本章对公共积累、成员角色与分配制度和成员资格制度进行了分析与效率的探讨。第5章农民专业合作经济组织变迁的制度动因分析。本章的研究目的在于尝试找出合作经济组织变迁的动力因素以及合作经济组织的边界。分析遵循的前提是制度的产生、创新和被替代是因为主体在潜在收益的驱动下进行的。中国农民专业合作经济组织的变迁动力有内部因素(交易费用),也有外部影响(政府)。合作经济组织之所以能成为诱致性制度变迁的目标取向,归根结底是由于这种制度具有潜在收益,主要体现在对市场交易费用的节约。同时,合作经济组织制度自身也有组织成本。潜在的收益—成本对比之下存在潜在的利润,这就是合作经济组织变迁的原因,变迁表现在数量的变化和组织规模的变化上。本章首先从制度成本—收益的角度,构建了一个交易费用模型,对农民专业合作经济组织进行了制度收益分析,然后研究了农民专业合作经济组织的内部制度成本,综合成本与收益进行了均衡分析。由于关注到农户决策是否组建合作经济组织时不仅考虑制度的成本—收益,更考虑到个人的成本,这一成本可能受到外部力量而改变—政府的影响。从理论上可以看出政府对制度的需求和供给有影响,从国外经验和现状中可以发现政府对合作组织发展普遍有扶持的政策。对于这种现象,文中给出了原因分析。第6章中国农民专业合作经济组织发展的趋势分析。在动力因素分析的基础上,本章结合合作经济组织发展过程中呈现出的特点以及当前的现状,研究了合作经济组织的变化发展。认为合作经济组织的制度设计的发展倾向于控制权集中的“股份化”,合作经济组织规模向横向一体化发展,产业链向上下游延伸呈纵向一体化趋势,同时运用案例提出政府对既有合作经济组织整合的影响。第7章简要结论。总结全文。在本文研究的前提假定的条件下,通过前面几章的分析,得出关于中国农民专业合作经济组织发展的10项结论性判断。期待能借此研究,从理论研究的角度对合作经济组织这种形式发展前景做一展望。

　　【关键词】 合作组织； 制度； 制度变迁；

　　【Abstract】 At the end of 70s of the 20th century, the establishment of the household contract responsibility system set up the family as the relatively independent main unit of agricultural production. On the one hand, farmers are established as the micro-economic subject. This provided the famers with an effective incentive and became one of the important influencing factorsin promoting agricultural growth and agricultural technological progress; On the other hand, decentralized, self-losses of agricultural production and management mechanisms will also place the farmers in the market competition and face market risks independently. Farmers show innate weakness in the market:not only the poor ability to take risks and to improve China’s agricultural productivity, but also the weakness in coping with the competition in the domestic market and the intensive international competition since China’s accession to the WTO. This production mode can not adapt to the agricultural industrilization and marketization development in China. The contradiction of small producers and large markets is becoming more and more striking.In the middle of the 80s in the 20th century, farmer specialized cooperatives were set up in china, which is on the basis of the rural household land contract system. Changing the agricultural production mode from family-centuralization, the cooperatives combine the farmers who are in the samilar agricultural production to engage in scale production and provide a wide range of services, such as product processing, product sales, market information, technical exchanges, and so on. There are a number of specialized cooperatives organized the farmers work integrately and create their own brand and face the market together. They are more effective in helping the scattered and small-scaled farmers in adapting to the large markets and play and important role in structural adjustment in agriculture, in increasing farmers income and agricultural efficiency. In recent years, the change of statistical data about the total number of farmer specialized cooperatives has been slow down. This shows that the development of farmer special cooperatives is changing from the quantity increase to the integration of scale and improvement of efficiency.It’s necessary that the theoretical research keep pace with the development of the practice. Although the domestic theoretical research on farmers specialized cooperatives is increasing gradually, because of the short history of development, most of them focus more on the research and interpretation on the basic principles of cooperation, the relationship between specialization and cooperation, the role and status of cooperatives in agricultural industrialization, its relationship with the government and relevant legal issues. There are a lot of problems in the integration of farmer specialized cooperatives need to be solved. The concept of different types of cooperatives need to be defined furtherly, studies on the system to be done, and analysis on the motives of various types of cooperatives to be made.The development of new Institutional Economics provides a good tool to study farmer specialized cooperatives. But now, the domestic works studying the farmer specialized cooperatives remains to be further enriched that combines China’s actual conditions with neo-institutional theories.In this paper, the neo-institutional economics theories and methods are used to study the institutional arrangements and changes of China’s farmer specialized cooperatives. Transactional cost theories, property rights theories, the logic of collective action and the classic game model are applied to analyze the following: Why do Chinese farmers will spontaneously set up specialized cooperatives? In what kind of external conditions will the farmer specialized cooperatives develope? Why it appeared such characteristics that different types of farmer specialized cooperative occupied the mainstream in different periods. What are the essential differences and boundaries between various types of farmer specialized cooperatives? What are their scale boundaries? What is the trend that shows in the development of farmer specialized cooperatives? And how is the impact of the government? In addition, this paper also focuses on the property rights of farmer specialized cooperatives. There are a lot of studies have pointed out that the ambiguous property rights are institutional defects of farmer specialized cooperatives.With such defects, how could the farmer specialized cooperatives develop so widely and quickly? Under what conditions do the property rights need to be clearly defined? Throuth what kind of institutions can the defects be made up in practice? Is there any space for the further development of the farmer specialized cooperatives in the future?There are seven chapters in this paper. Chapter 1 Introduction. On the basis of introducing the research background, the foundation of choosing this topic and sorting out the development and changes, this chapter makes necessary explaination on various types of farmer specialized cooperatives in present Chinese rural area and defines the meaning and form of "farmer specialized cooperative" in practice. Chapter 2 Review and summary on theory. It reviews the the theoretical research results both domestic and abroad and iritruduces the status of current research:The foreign research results are classified according to the development of cooperative theory. The representative theories under the influence of new-classical and neo-institutional economics are introduced more detailed. Domestic research is introduced according to the perspective and contents. On the above basis, brief commentary on the progress and shortcomings of the cooperative theories domestic and foreign are given in this chapter.Chapter 3 The engender and current situation of Chinese farmer specialized cooperatives. In the neo-institutional economics framework, with transactional cost theory, this chapter analyzes the supervision in agricultural production, the evaluation in the trade of agricultural products and transactional costs caused by the post-contractual opportunistic behavior and propose that saving transaction costs is the main reason why cooperatives are developed in agriculture.Transactional costs in China’s agricultural market is great because of the distinct characteristics of Chines agriculture. The land averagely contracted according to the population makes the smallest agricultural producing scale; the huge number of farmer formes a market with the most subjects; and the household contract responsibility system and the far seperated land determin the dispersion of Chinese agricultural production. It is precisely because of these reasons that farmer specialized cooperatives set up spontaneously by Chinese farmers developed so quickly. This chapter introduces the industry distribution and size of cooperatives, and especially the current status quo in Liaoning Provinces. From the history and current situation of farmer specialized cooperative, the main form appeared to be professional associations in the embryonic stage, and gradually to be the specialized cooperative and joint-stock cooperative later.Chapter 4 Analysis on the property rights of China’s farmer specialized cooperative. Property rights are the core of the institutions and the basis on which people make decisions. Cost need to be payed and profits be gained in defining property rights. It is generally considered in the research abroad that the ambigious property rights makes the cooperative the organization with low efficiency. The farmer specialized cooperatives are innovatively divided into private property rights ones and public property rights ones in this chapter according to the property rights theory. Characteristics and structures of these two kinds of organizations. Through these analyses, it proposes that the control of members under different property rights is different. The cost in maintaining the control to the members of cooperative is also the cost in maintaining the property rights, that is, the cost of property rights. China’s farmer specialized cooperatives have their own unique design of property rights on the basis of basic principles of cooperation. The analysis of public accumulation, the system of distribution based on the roles of members, the system of membership and the efficiency of the above.Chapter 5 Analysis on the factors that cause the vicissitudes of farmer specialized cooperative. The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to identify the factors of the vicissitudes of farmer specialized cooperative and its boundary. The analysis followed the premise that the production, innovation, and being replaced of the institution is under the driving of the potential gains to the subjects. There are internal and external factors (the government) that cause the vicissitudes of the institutions of China’s farmer specialized cooperatives. The reason why cooperatives be the orientation of spontaneous institutional vicissitude is that it has potential profit which is reflected in saving transactional costs. Of course, at the same time, it also takes cost in organizing. Potential profits from the deduction of potential benefits and the cost, that is, the reasons for the vicissitude of farmer specialized cooperative. The vicissitude is reflected on the changes of quantity and size. In this chapter, first of all. a model of transactional cost is built to analyze the institutional benefit from the point of view of institutional cost and benefit of farmers specialized cooperative. Then after its internal institutional cost is studied, an equilibrium analysis on the cost and benefit is conducted. The fact that farmer makes decision whether to set up cooperatives or not on considering both institutional cost-benefit, and personal cost, which may be changed by external forces-the impact of the Government. Theoretically the impact may be the influence on demand and supply of institutions. Supportive policies are commonly found in the experience and current situation abroad. There is analysis on the reason for this phenomenon in this chapter.Chapter 6 Analysis on the trend of China’s farmer specialized cooperative. On the basis of analyzing factors of institutional vicissitude, the characteristics in the development and current stitution of farmer specialized cooperative is studied in this chapter, and as well as the changing of cooperatives. It proposes the idea that the "stockholder-power-centered" of control tends to show in the development of institutional design; the scale of farmer specialized cooperative tends to transversal all-in-one; industrial chain extends advanced and backward and tends to be vertical integration. Cases are used to explain the impact on the integration of cooperatives from the government.Chapter 7 Brief conclusions. This chapter is a summary of the whole paper. At the premise and conditions proposed in Chapter 1 and through the analysis in the earlier chapters, ten conclusive judgement about the development of China’s farmer specialized cooperatives are drawn in this chapter, which is looked forward to show prospects of cooperatives theoretically.

　　【Key words】 farmer specialized cooperative； institution； institutional vicissitude；