【摘要】 本文分两个部分展开：合作组织的理论分析和实证分析。第一部分，合作组织的理论分析。第一章，运用重复博弈理论探寻合作组织的基石。重复博弈理论表明当博弈的次数足够多，博弈重复进行的时候，合作的结果在参与人之间可以达成，这就为合作组织找到了存在的基石。分析表明，合作组织的背后有一个共同的因素在作用，那就是合作社内部成员相互之间以某种方式产生了可信性的信誉基础。第二章，探讨监督对合作组织的重要性。由于合作组织监督的困难，它可能适合于这样的领域：期望有更多的偷懒，同时期望更少的对市场价值作直接反映的组织。因此，发展合作组织必须注意其主客观条件是否具备。随着客观经济环境的变化，合作组织可能演变为治理结构更加合理的组织形式。第三章，探讨合作组织中平等和效率的关系。霍尔姆斯托姆的研究指出，在一个封闭的、预算平衡的，即平均分配的组织内，搭便车可能导致诸如劳动努力等生产性投入的供给不足。当放松预算平衡的条件时，引入一个可以获得非预算平衡分配规则剩余的委托人，合作组织就可以在一定程度上恢复效率。麦克洛伊德论证当社员退出合作社的成本较高时，一个合作社的效率可以通过社员之间的相互威胁战略来实现。第四章，讨论退出权、退出成本与合作均衡的关系。麦克洛伊德认为对社员来说，合作均衡的存在要求一个较高的退出成本。林毅夫认为，社员的退社权是保证合作社运动成功的必要条件。董和道证明，退出权的引入可能使一个合作组织加速崩溃，从而导致规模经济的丧失。普特曼和斯格曼认为，对退出权更为全面的理解是，当偷懒的社员为逃避其他社员对自己的惩罚而退出合作社时，只要社员在合作社之外获得的预期效用大于社员对偷懒的最大反应的效用水平，那么引入退出权将降低合作的可能性。当社员的相互退出是对偷懒社员的一种惩罚时，只要合作社具有显著的规模经济，那么社员的合作在有退出权时更有可能。第二部分是信用合作组织的实证分析。具体分析中国农村信用社对合作组织效率条件的违背及其结果，同时对中国农村信用社的发展和改革作深入探讨。第五章，回顾信用合作社的发展历程。从中外信用合作社兴衰的历史中可以看到信用合作社良性运转的一些重要前提条件。国外的互助性合作组织，其产生背景都是相似的，那就是在合作成员处于劣势地位时，他们更容易团结起来加入合作组织，从而获得合作收益，以抵御各种不利环境。中国早期信用合作社的发展说明，合作组织坚持自愿、民主、独立等原则的重要性。另一方面，合作社的发展表明，合作社首先要在合作成员自愿的条件下建立，但是，仅仅有农民的自愿是不够的，还必须有外部力量的推动。正是大量德高望重的人士积极参与合作运动，合作社才得以建立和健康发展。中国农村信用社的曲折发展历程表明，农村信用合作社始终处于政府的强力控制中，其性质模糊不清。第六章，考察信用合作社的合作原则。这些合作原则是信用合作的具体制度安排，是信用合作实践的产物。罗虚代尔原则涉及到合作组织的平等、互助、非营利等重要内容。国际合作联盟的合作原则体现了罗虚代尔原则的基本精神。在信用合作原则方面，莱夫艾森和舒尔茨-德利奇信用合作原则的主要内容已经蕴涵在合作原则中。威廉·哈斯的信用合作原则具有更为开放的视野和更为自由的氛围。纵观合作原则和信用合作原则在各个时期的规定可知，尽管随着客观经济环境的变化，具体的合作原则可能有一些差异，但是合作制的内核从来没有变动过。自愿、平等、民主、非营利等基本理念一直耕植于合作社发展的全过程。尽管中国农村信用社的几个章程都包含了合作原则的核心内容，但是，农村信用合作社的实践却与合作原则相去甚远。在现阶段，农村信用合作社已经背离了自愿、互助、民主、非营利等核心的合作原则。第七章，深入到信用合作组织内考察其治理结构。完善的合作组织治理结构是合作原则的具体化，是合作制度的本质体现。信用合作社的产权结构是有缺失的。随着信用合作社的发展，其产权制度的一些弊端也逐渐呈现。因此，信用合作社的产权制度出现了如下一些重要变化：差异化的入股权、实现了按股分红、赋予股权部分转让权等。信用合作社的治理结构主要是处理三种关系：社员大会或社员代表大会对监事会、理事会的选举、批评和罢免关系；监事会对理事会的监督关系；理事会对信用合作社的领导关系。在中国的实践中，信用合作社的治理结构出现如下一些问题：一是社员代表大会作用发挥不够；二是理事会与经营班子关系不顺；三是监事会不能发挥正常的监督作用。第八章，对中国农村信用社的运行效率进行实证分析。分析表明，破坏了合作均衡条件的必然结果是合作组织运行的低效率。中国农村信用社的经营出现以下一些特征：社均存贷款规模比较小；贷款对象日益非农化；股金偏低，自有资金缺乏；存贷款总额剪刀差和农户存贷款的剪刀差。中国农村信用社的经营绩效呈现出不良资产比例高、资金成本高、亏损面大等；制度性绩效表现为互助性质淡化、决策机制弱化、激励机制缺乏。因此……

　　【Abstract】 The dissertation has two parts. One is theoretical analysis and the other is empirical analysis of cooperative organization.The first part is theoretical analysis of cooperative organization.Chapter 1 explains the basis of cooperative organization through repeated game theory. Repeated game theory shows when the game is repeated, which means the times of game is unlimited, cooperative outcome can be achieved among the players in the game.Chapter 2 discusses the importance of supervision of cooperative organization. On account of its difficulty of supervision, cooperative organization may be especially appropriate in realms of endeavor where more shirking is desired and where redirected uses of the enterprise in response to market-revealed values are less desired.Chapter 3 mainly focuses on the contradiction between equity and efficiency in cooperative organization. According to Holmstrom, it is necessary to soften budget balance, which is regarded as the symbol of equity of cooperative organization, in order to keep the efficiency of cooperative organization. Macleod, however, believes that the efficiency of cooperative organization can be maintained when there is a high exit cost for the members of the cooperative organization.Chapter 4 expounds the relationship between exit right and cooperative equilibrium of cooperative organization. Macleod believes that high exit cost is crucial to the equilibrium of cooperative, while Lin insists that deprival of exit right is the main reason of the failure of Chinese Farm Cooperatives. Dong and Dow’s theoretical reseach further affirms Macleod’s conclusion. Finally, Putterman and Skillman put forward a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between exit right and equilibrium of cooperative organization.The second part of the paper is empirical analysis of cooperative organization. This part mainly focuses on credit union, which is an important kind of cooperative organizations in the world, and especially on the Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs)in China.Chapter 5 retrospect’s the history of Credit Union so that some important preconditions can be found to keep Credit Union to run efficiently.It is Robert Owen’s New Harmony Cooperative that advanced the movement of cooperative throughout the world. The backgrounds of Rochdale Equitable Pioneers Society, Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen credit union, and Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch credit union are similar. That is to say, when the members are at inferior positions, it is easy for them to join a cooperative organization to deal with all kinds of bad environments.The development history of many credit cooperatives in China, such as credit cooperatives originated by Huayang Aid and Rescue Association of China, set up by Shumin Liang, promoted by Yangchu Yan, and so on, suggests that it is of great significance to keep the principles of voluntary, autonomy, independence, democratic in cooperative organization. On the other hand, the history of credit cooperatives also suggests that it is absolutely necessary for cooperative organization to be promoted by outer forces in order to speed up its development. It is the participation of many people with good reputation that make cooperative organization develop quickly.As far as the RCCs are concerned, on account of the government’s fierce control, there is great uncertainty for their development. When the government softens its control on the RCCs, they would be in good condition. On the contrary, when the government controls the RCCs forcefully, they would be in bad condition. Therefore, the independence of credit cooperatives is very important. Chapter 6 reviews the principles of cooperative, which are the concrete institution arrangement of cooperative organization and the outcome of practice of credit cooperatives.Rochdale Principles include some important cooperative principles, such as equity, mutual help, non-profit, and so on. Cooperative principles of International Cooperative Alliance reflect the spirit of ……

　　【关键词】 合作组织； 博弈； 信用合作社； 治理结构；

　　【Key words】 Cooperative organization； Game theory； Credit Union； Governance structure；