【摘要】 经济的发展离不开资本的支撑，在国家大力推进农村经济改革，农村各项事业取得较大发展的同时，我们看到资本制约始终是横在农村经济发展面前的一块绊脚石。究其原因，一方面是因为农村金融体制改革以后，农村金融市场上正规金融供给主体减少，商业银行受到信息不对称、农村市场分散化和农户缺乏抵押物的影响，减少了资金的投入。另一方面是因为农户信用状况不对称很难取得正规金融机构的小额信用贷款，农业受自然风险的影响较大，农户自身组织化程度低，资金实力不强，很难获得商业性贷款。因此长期以来农户融资的主要渠道仍然是亲友借贷和私人放贷，农户融资难问题始终是理论界研究的一个重要问题。公共选择理论告诉我们要解决农户的弱势现状，必须从农户自身角度出发，建立一个能真正代表农户自身利益的组织，提高其组织化程度，维护其集体利益，农民专业合作组织应运而生。它把农户联合起来，降低了生产成本和交易费用，提高了市场谈判地位和抵御风险的能力，增强农业的市场竞争力，促进了农村经济的发展。

　　本文正是在此基础上，提出假设，引入农民专业合作组织作为农户融资信用担保中介，并运用实际调查数据和博弈论研究方法探讨了农民专业合作组织作为农户融资信用担保中介所起的信用促进作用。同时运用耗散结构理论构建了农民专业合作组织参与下的农户融资信用循环系统，分析了系统的稳定性表现特征和影响系统稳定性的具体因素，最后通过权重的确定并运用模糊辨识模型详细分析了这一循环系统的稳定性影响因素，最后给出结论建议。以此充分说明构建以农民专业合作组织作为农户融资信用担保中介的农村多元化信用担保体系的现实意义，以此来探索一条解决农户融资难问题的途径。

　　本文共六章，主要从以下方面展开研究：

　　第一章：导论。本章主要对本文的研究背景、研究意义和研究目的做一个概述，针对本文的研究内容阐述了国内外的研究动态，在此基础上提出本文的研究思路和研究方法，并给出本文的创新之处。

　　第二章：农户整体融资现状分析。主要通过对样本地区农户融资现状、以及影响农户融资的因素进行分析，认识样本地区的农村金融现状和农户面临的融资难问题，为后文引入农民专业合作组织作为信用担保中介做铺垫。

　　第三章：农民专业合作组织作为农户融资信用担保中介分析。在前文研究的基础上认识到引入担保中介的必要性，对农民专业合作组织作为农户融资信用担保中介进行了理论上和实践上的可行性分析。并运用博弈论研究方法对农民专业合作组织参与前后各融资主体之间博弈情况进行对比分析，阐述了农民专业合作组织作为信用担保中介对农户融资起到的促进作用，验证了以农民专业合作组织作为农户融资信用担保中介开展农户融资这一模式的有效性。

　　第四章：耗散结构理论下的农户融资信用循环系统构建，本章在前文研究的基础上，基于耗散结构理论构建了以农民专业合作组织作为信用担保中介的农户融资信用循环系统，根据耗散结构理论阐述了农户融资信用循环系统的稳定性表现，并具体分析了影响这一系统稳定性的影响因素。

　　第五章：农户融资信用循环系统稳定性影响因素评判。根据前文对稳定性影响因素的分析，本章建立了农户融资信用循环系统稳定性影响因素评价指标体系和评价模型，运用层次分析法和模糊评判模型详细分析了影响农户融资信用循环系统稳定性的各因素。并根据实证分析结果对这一系统给予整体评价。

　　第六章：提高专业合作组织中农户融资信用稳定性的建议。本章从循环系统的各影响因素出发，有针对性地给出了优化农户融资信用的政策建议。

　　最后总结本文的研究成果及今后的研究方向。

　　【ABSTRACT】Economic development is inseparable from the support of capital, while the country promoting the rural economic reform, and have made great undertakings in the rural development, we see capital is always limited, on the one hand, it is because after the reform of the rural financial system, faced with the imperfect information, market diversification and farmers lack of the mortgaged property, the formal financial supply reduced. On the other hand, because of information asymmetry, it hard for famers to get the microcredit loans, what' more, the agriculture faced much risk, farmers organizational level is low and capital strength is not strong, it is difficult to get commercial loans. So for a long time the main channel to farmers financing is still private lending, farmers financing problem research has always been one of the important problems. The public choice theory tell us to solve the present situation, we must establish an organization representative of the famers interests. Which can improve the organizational level and maintain their collective interests, Farmers' specialized cooperative organizations is almost this organization. It put the farmers together, reduces their cost of production and transaction, improve their market negotiating position and resist their ability of the risk, which enhances the competitiveness of agriculture and development the rural economy.

　　Based on this, this article take farmers' specialized cooperative organizations as farmers financing credit guarantee agencies, and use the actual survey data and the game theory method to discuss the effect, build he credit cycle farmers financing system use dissipative structure theory. And analyzes the stability and the influence of the stability of the system, and finally gives results suggest. This shows that take farmers' specialized cooperative organizations as farmers credit guarantee agencies is useful, so as to fund a new way to solve the farmers financing difficulties.

　　There are 6 chapters.

　　Chapter1: introduction.

　　This chapter elaborates the research background, significance and purpose. It outlines the trends of relative theories domestic and abroad, and outlines the thinking, methods and innovation of this article.

　　Chapter 2: analyze the current farmers financing situation

　　This chapter analyzes the current situation and affecting factors of farmers financing, realizes farmers financing difficulties, and prepares for the next chapter.

　　Chapter 3: discuss taking farmers' specialized cooperative organizations as farmers financing credit guarantee agencies.

　　Ease on the analyzes of chapter 2,realize the necessity of guarantee agencies, this chapter analysis the feasibility of taking farmers' specialized cooperative organizations as farmers financing credit guarantee form theory and practice aspects.

　　Chapter 4: building the farmers financing credit circulation system based on the theory of dissipative structure.

　　This chapter builds the farmers financing credit circulation system, which constructs the farmers' specialized cooperative organizations as the credit guarantee agencies, and research the stability performance and the influence factors affecting the stability.

　　Chapter 5: research the stability of farmers financing credit cycle system based on the theory of dissipative structure.

　　Based on the dissipative structure theory, according to the farmer credit financing circulation system, this chapter establishes the evaluation index system and evaluation model, analyzes the impact index and the maintenance condition.

　　Chapter 6: optimization of famers financing credit.

　　It gives the advice on optimizing the famers financing credit.

　　Review and outlook

　　This chapter summarize the whole article，points out the limitation and the future efforts of this article.

　　【关键词】 农户融资； 农民专业合作组织； 信用担保； 博弈论与信息经济学； 耗散结构理论；

　　【KEYWORDS】rural households financing, farmer cooperative organizations, the credit guarantee, game theory and information economics, dissipative structure theory