【摘要】 农村土地股份合作制是我国农村土地产权制度的改革与创新,是在实践中探索出的一种土地流转方式。它最早起源于1992年的广东南海、宝安等地。随着农业结构调整步伐加快和土地规模经营制度的不断改革,农村土地股份合作制在广东、福建等沿海发达地区不断扩展,中西部地区和边远地区农村也先后展开各种形式的农村土地股份合作制试点,并取得了一定的成效。农村土地股份合作制作为一种典型的诱致性制度变迁,能够克服现行的土地集体所有、家庭平均承包经营的弊病,表现出明显的社会效应,也成为理论界关注的热点问题。

　　作为一种新型制度探索,农村土地股份合作制在实施过程中存在诸多问题,如产权结构不明晰、农村土地承包经营权入股估价不科学、收益分配制度不规范、风险防范机制不健全、相关配套制度建设滞后等,这直接影响了农村土地股份合作制制度绩效的充分发挥。论文综合运用现代经济学、管理学理论及数理技术,对农村土地股份合作制的组织模式、农地使用权入股定价、产权制度安排、治理结构效率改进、利益分配与风险管理以及配套制度建设进行理论与实证研究,进一步丰富和发展农村土地股份合作制理论。论文构建的农村土地股份合作制规范运作框架,以及提出的进一步推动农地股份合作制发展的相关措施和政策建议,将为农村土地股份合作制的具体实践和政府相关部门的政策制定提供参考依据。因此,论文研究对规范农村土地流转、优化农业产业结构、促进农民增收无疑具有重要的理论价值和现实意义。

　　(1)论文首先对农村土地股份合作制的相关概念进行界定,分析了农村土地股份合作制的主要模式、法律依据及其适应性条件；利用新制度经济学理论对农村土地股份合作制流转的成因进行阐释；根据土地产出效益模型公式和劳动力效用综合评定模型公式,编制土地流转模式经济绩效综合评价指数、土地流转模式社会绩效综合评价指数,在此基础上,对各土地流转模式的经济社会综合绩效进行实证比较,分析农村土地股份合作制绩效的比较优势。农村土地股份合作制流转模式提供理论与实证依据。

　　(2)不同的农村土地股份合作制组织模式,制度实施的磨擦成本、组织成本和交易成本是不同的。论文对农村土地股份合作制的相关利益主体(农民、企业及地方政府)进行博弈分析,分析各利益主体的行为策略。按“牵头人”或“发起人”的类型的不同,创新农村土地股份合作制流转的组织模式,并对各种组织模式的适应性条件进行分析。最后,充分考虑我国农村经济发展的不平衡性,探讨非农产业较发达地区与非农产业欠发达地区农村土地股份合作制组织模式的最优选择。

　　(3)利用地租地价理论、产权价格理论以及土地收益理论,分析农村土地承包经营权入股价值评估的理论依据；从自然环境因素、经济社会因素、土地供需状况以及土地用途等角度,深入分析农村土地承包经营权入股价值的影响因素。在此基础上,采用模糊物元分析法和CBR技术,建立农村土地使用权入股价格评估模型,并进行实例分析。为农村土地使用权入股定价提供参考。

　　(4)从压缩内生交易费用来说,农村土地股份合作制的产权安排部分地是有效率的。但是这一产权安排存在着隐患,即在减少的同时,又内生出不同程度的交易费用。鉴于此,论文运用内生交易费用理论对农村土地股份合作制产权安排绩效进行评价。在此基础上,对农村土地股份合作制的产权进行界定,建立有效的股权配置机制,包括股权结构、持股比例等等。最后,研究建立农村土地股份合作制的股权流通机制,引导股权合理流动,解决企业股权不能流动所带来的问题。

　　(5)农村土地股份合作制的治理结构是一个复杂的制度安排,目的是为了解决企业内部分工和激励问题,防止道德风险的产生。论文对农村土地股份合作制中的委托——代理关系进行阐述,分析道德风险产生的根源,利用内生交易费用理论对其治理结构效率进行评价,在此基础上,研究建立农村土地股份合作制道德风险防范的激励——监督机制,提出改善农村土地股份合作制治理结构效率的措施。

　　(6)农村土地股份合作制的利益分配过程,同时也是各产权主体利益协商的过程。同时,发展土地股份合作必须建立风险保障机制,确保土地收益,这是实行股份合作制的基本出发点和归宿,也是衡量土地股份合作是否成功的主要标志。论文以股权设置为基础,利用合作博弈理论,建立利益分配的Nash协商模型和群体加权重心模型,合理协调各种股权利益分配的比例。然后,对农村股份合作制面临的可能风险进行识别,研究建立多角度、多层次的风险规避机制,减少股份制的运营风险,从而解决失地农民的保障问题。

　　(7)任何一项制度的出台和绩效发挥都必须有相关制度的配套支持。论文从地方政府角色的合理定位、农村土地流转市场机制的规范与完善、法律法规环境的优化、财政金融支持以及农村社会保障制度的建立与健全等角度构建农村土地股份合作制发展的支撑体系。

　　(8)在前期调研的基础上,进一步赴长沙市农村经济经营管理局和长沙县、浏阳市和望城县部分土地股份合作制流转典型个案现场进行实地调查,收集第一手资料数据,进行实证研究,验证论文所建立的理论模型,并提出针对性较强的对策建议。

　　【ABSTRACT】Rural Land Shareholding Co-operative System is the reform andinnovation of our country's rural land property and rights system, and is amode of land transfer coming from the practice. It originated initially inthe Nanhai of Guangzhou and Baoan and so on in the 1992. With theaccelerated pace of the agricultural adjustment and the continued reformof the land scale running system, stock cooperative system of rural landdeveloped well in Guangdong, Fujian and other coastal areas, besidescountries in central and western regions and remote areas have alsolaunched into various forms of stock cooperative system of rural landpilot, and have made something. Stock cooperative system of rural land,as a typical induced institutional change, is able to overcome theshortcomings of the current collective land ownership and the averagehousehold contract management, besides it shows apparent social effects,and it has been a hot question attended by the theorists.

　　As a exploration of new system, stock cooperative system of ruralland shows many questions during the period of its implement, such asownership structure not clear, rural land contract and management rightsshares valued unscientific, income distribution system not standardized,risk prevention not perfect, Supporting the construction of the systemlagged behind and so on, which directly impact on the fully exertion ofstock cooperative system of rural land. This paper, whichcomprehensively uses modern economics, management science andmathematical techniques, does theoretical and empirical research on theorganizational model of stock cooperative system of rural land, pricingshares of agricultural land use rights, arrangements of property rightssystem, improvements of the efficiency of the governance structure, thedistribution of benefits and risk management and supporting systems, andfurther enriches and develops the theory of stock cooperative system ofrural land. The framework for the standard operation of stock cooperativesystem of rural land established in the paper and relevant measures andpolicy advises proposed further to promote the development of stock cooperative system of rural land, will provide reference for the specificpractice of stock cooperative system of rural land and policy formulationof relevant government departments. So the paper study will undoubtedlyhave important theoretical and practical significances for regulating ruralland, optimizing industrial structure of agriculture, increasing income forfarmers.

　　(1) First,in this paper we define the related concepts of theshareholding cooperative system of rural lands,and analyse its mainmode，legal basis and adaptable conditions.In the meanwhile, we explainthe causes of the circulation of shareholding rural lands according to newinstitutional economics theories.Besides, according to the model formulasof Land productivity efficiency and the comprehensive assessment oflabor efficiency, we work out the comprehensive evaluation indexes ofthe economic and social performance of the mode for the rural landcirculation. On this basis,we make empirical comparison of the economicand social performance of various modes and analyse the comparativeadvantages of the shareholding cooperative system of rural lands toprovide theoretical and empirical evidence.

　　(2) Different rural land shareholding cooperative organizationmodels,the costs of friction, organization and transaction are diffrrent.Inthis paper, we make game analysis of the main stakeholders(farmers,enterprises and local governments) in rural land shareholding cooperativesysterm and their behavioral strategies.According to the different types of"lead" or "sponsor",we create the organizational models of rural landshareholding cooperative system and analyse its adaptive conditions. Atlast, considering fully Chinese unbalanced economic development in ruralareas,we discuss the optimal choice of the organizational model in moredeveloped regions and underdeveloped regions of non-agriculturalindustries.

　　(3) Based on the Land rent and price theory, the price theory ofproperty rights and land revenue theory,we analyse the theoretical basisof the rural land contract and management rights for assessing the valueof shares and its factors in terms of natural environment, economy andsociety, land supply and demand, and the land uses.On this basis, with the use of fuzzy matter-element analysis and CBR technology,we establish amodel to evaluate the share price of rural land-use right and make caseanalysis.

　　(4) From the compression of the endogenous transaction costs, theownership arrangement of stock cooperative system of rural land isefficient in part. But there are risks in this ownership arrangement, suchas during the time of reducing, it will produce different levels oftransaction costs. In view of this, the paper uses the theory of endogenoustransaction costs to evaluate the performance of property rightsarrangements of stock cooperative system of rural land. On this basis, wedefine the property rights of stock cooperative system of rural land, andestablish efficient equity allocation mechanism, including ownershipstructure, ownership percentage and so on. Finally, it studies andestablishes the shares in circulation of stock cooperative system of ruralland, and guides the rational flow of equity, besides, solve the problemsarising from the inflow of equity.

　　(5) The governance structure of rural land shareholding cooperativesystem is a complex institutional arrangements,in order to solve theproblem of internal division of work and incentives and prevent thegeneration of moral hazard. In this paper,we describe the principal - agentrelationship, analyze the root causes of moral hazard and evaluate theefficiency of its governance structure with the use of endogenoustransaction cost theory.Based on this, we study the establishment ofincentive-monitoring mechanism to prevent moral hazard and putforward measurs to improve rural land shareholding cooperativegovernance structure efficiency.

　　(6) The process of the interests allocation of stock cooperativesystem of rural land, at the same time, it is the process of the interestsconsultation of all kinds of the property rights. What's more, to developstock cooperative system of rural land must establish the risk protectionmechanism to make sure the land revenue, which is the fundamentalstarting point and destination to implement the stock cooperative systemof rural land, and also the main symbol to measure whether it issuccessful of stock cooperative system of rural land. The paper based on the equity setting, uses cooperative game theory, and sets up the Nashnegotiation model for the distribution of interests andpopulation-weighted center of gravity model in order to reasonablycoordinate the proportion of interests distribution of all kinds of equities.Thus, it identifies the possible risks faced by the stock cooperative systemof rural land, then it studies and establishes multi-angle and multi-levelrisk aversion mechanism to reduce the operational risk of the stock, inorder to address the protecting issue of landless peasants.

　　(7) Any introduction and performing of a system must have therelated systems to support. In this paper,we build the support system todevelop the rural land shareholding cooperative system in terms of thereasonable position of local government, the improvement of marketmechanisms, the optimization of the laws and regulations，fiscal andfinancial support, the establishment of sound rural social security systemand so on.

　　【关键词】 土地流转； 农村土地股份合作制； 产权制度； 治理结构； 支撑体系；

　　【Keywords】 Land Circulation, Rural lands shareholding co-operativesystem, Property system , Governance Structure， Support system